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Gilmore Commission Calls for Independent Center to Coordinate Terrorism
Intelligence
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able to terrorism, but actual threats from terrorists need to be
defined, the commission found. Several dual-use actions
can be taken to protect the agricultural sector and food sup-
ply from terrorist attacks and naturally occurring disease
outbreaks, including increasing laboratory capacity, educa-
tion and training to deal with foreign animal diseases. 
• Improving the Protection of Critical Infrastructure: The
Gilmore Commission recommended creation of an inde-
pendent commission to suggest strategies for protection of
the nation’s critical infrastructure, and urged that the
Department of Homeland Security elevate the priority of
other aspects of critical infrastructure protection. 
Vulnerability of Wireless Local Area Networks to
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A wide variety of wireless systems
are used in both the civilian and military
sectors. Many organizations have chosen
wireless local area networks (WLANs)
over hardwired networks because of their
convenience and flexibility. One chal-
lenge in deploying systems that radiate in
free space is the possibility of the signal
being intercepted by unauthorized users.
For example, portable computers with
client adapter antennas could be placed
covertly so as to intercept the WLAN
microwave transmission signal. 
Even though the power levels
involved are very low, a person just out-
side of a building or in a lobby could con-
ceivably receive and record signals for
analysis at a later time. There are unique
propagation conditions that occur inside
of buildings and in "urban canyons" that
could enhance signal detection under cer-
tain circumstances. Thus, the WLAN is
vulnerable to uninvited intruders who
could collect sensitive information or
possibly even disrupt the computer net-
work by injecting deceptive signals.
According to K. Pahlavan’s article
"Trends in Local Wireless Networks,"
which was published in the March
1995 issue of  IEEE
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
Magazine, several secu-
rity measures have been
incorporated into the WLAN
standards. For example, authen-
tication and encryption would  pro-
vide data security. And, networks
with media access control (MAC) con-
tain address-based access lists on access
points registers and recognize MAC
addresses that are allowed to join the net-
work. Radius server-based authentication
would provide security for the network
by assuring that users are authenticated
against a centralized radius server that is
based on the MAC address or the user-
name and password.
Encryption between the wireless 
adapter and the access point would pro-
vide security with the network. Wired
equivalent privacy is an algorithm
designed to provide privacy for data
transmitted between the wireless client
and the access point. It utilizes data
encryption with 40-bit or 128-bit keys
that are hidden from users, according to
Sandeep Singhal’s "The Seven Deadly
Sins of Wireless LANS,"  available at
www.reefedge.com.
Although complex encryption tech-
niques would make it difficult for the
average person to penetrate the system,
the algorithms built into the network
software have been defeated by knowl-
edgeable hackers. The first step in the
hacking process would be gaining unau-
thorized access to network traffic. In
many cases this is most easily accom-
plished by intercepting wireless signals.
Thus, predicting and subsequently con
trolling the electromagnetic radiation is
an effective means of securing the
network.
In general, the approach to providing
effective WLAN access for users is to
position hubs to cover the desired area
adequately, most often by trial and error.
Electromagnetic wave propagation mod-
eling in indoor and urban environments
is difficult because of the interactions
between a large number of scattering
objects such as walls and furniture.
Modern buildings and furnishings use
many materials that affect propagation
by attenuation, reflection, and diffrac-
tion. Building walls, floors, landscape,
and even adjacent buildings affect the
manner in which these signals propagate.
The underlying electromagnetic the-
ory is well understood, and accurate
propagation simulations are achievable
with sufficient computational resources,
such as CPU time and memory, and high-
fidelity building models. Often, the lack
of knowledge of the materials enclosed
in a wall limits the accuracy of a
simulation, not a shortcoming in the elec-
tromagnetic analysis.
Figure 1: Computer model of a two-story
office building
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Research at the Naval
Postgraduate School, sponsored
by the Department of Justice, has
examined the vulnerability of
WLANs to interception and pro-
vided some simple steps that can
be taken to improve security.
Science Application International
Corp.’s Urbana Wireless Toolset
was used to predict signal levels
in complex environments such as
the inside of a building. The
propagation model is essentially
a 3-D ray tracing process that
predicts the local mean power
received at any given point. The
model includes the effects of
wave polarization, material prop-
erties, and antenna patterns. The
simulations provided contours of
power levels that could predict
the maximum detection distance of the
wireless signals.
Figure 1 shows a model of a two-
story building that might be occupied  by
a small business. The building footprint is
a square, 40 feet on a side. A WLAN
access point antenna, located on the first
floor at the + symbol, was considered to
be transmitting. The signal levels were
calculated at points inside and outside of
the building using Urbana.
Figure 2 shows the power levels for a
transmitter power of 100 milliwatts,
which is the highest power allowed. The
building walls are a metal composite, and
standard glass windows are used.
The receiver sensitivity is the
minimum power required for main-
taining the link. WLAN sensitivi-
ties range from –94 dBm for 1
Mbps to –85 dBm for 11 Mbps,
where dBm is a decibel relative to a
milliwatt reference, according to
www.cisco.com. Although the
strongest signals are confined to
the interior of the building, signifi-
cant levels are transmitted through
the walls and windows. No inter-
ception would be possible in the
dark  blue areas. Note that at the
lowest data rate, interception is
possible over most of the computa-
tional grid that is 1800 inches (150
feet) on a side.
In Figure 3 the standard glass
windows are replaced by tinted
glass. There has been a significant
reduction in the power outside of the
building. A further reduction in power can
be achieved by moving the transmit
antenna to the second floor, as evident in
Figure 4.
The fact that the WLAN is contained
inside a closed building gives a false 
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Figure 2: Power levels for a building with metal composite walls and standard
glass windows. Units are decibels relative to a milliwatt (dBm). Strong signals
passing through the windows are evident.
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Figure 3: Outside power levels are reduced using tinted glass,
which reflects signals back into the building.
Figure 4: Outside power levels are reduced further after moving the
access point antenna to the second floor.
sense of security. Many small businesses
use WLANs, yet system administrators
are not aware of the susceptibility of
these systems to interception, or feel that
they do not have the resources to tighten
security. However, some steps could
reduce the probability of interception,
including:
1. locate access points in the most
interior building spaces
2. close all exterior doors and win-
dows
3. use metal blinds or tinting on exte-
rior windows
4. use directive or sectored access
point antennas to confine the direc-
tion of strong radiation
5. use the lowest possible power set-
tings
6. buildings with metal exterior walls
are preferred over those with wood 
These simple measures can deny ter-
rorists access to the information they
need to inflict damage.
Dr. David C. Jenn is an associate professor in
the Department of Electrical & Computer
Engineering at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Paul Sumagaysay is a lieutenant in the U.S.
Navy, and recently graduated from the
Information Warfare program at the Naval
Postgraduate School.
